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Abstract
Detecting offensive language on Twitter
has many applications ranging from detect-
ing/predicting bullying to measuring polariza-
tion. In this paper, we focus on building ef-
fective Arabic offensive tweet detection. We
introduce a method for building an offensive
dataset that is not biased by topic, dialect, or
target. We produce the largest Arabic dataset
to date with special tags for vulgarity and
hate speech. Next, we analyze the dataset to
determine which topics, dialects, and gender
are most associated with offensive tweets and
how Arabic speakers use offensive language.
Lastly, we conduct a large battery of exper-
iments to produce strong results (F1 = 79.7)
on the dataset using Support Vector Machine
techniques.
1 Introduction
Disclaimer: Due to the nature of the paper, some
examples contain highly offensive language and
hate speech. They don’t reflect the views of the
authors in any way, and the point of the paper is to
help fight such speech.
Much recent interest has focused on the detec-
tion of offensive language and hate speech in on-
line social media. Such language is often asso-
ciated with undesirable online behaviors such as
trolling, cyberbullying, online extremism, politi-
cal polarization, and propaganda. Thus, offen-
sive language detection is instrumental for a va-
riety of application such as: quantifying polar-
ization (Barbera´ and Sood, 2015; Conover et al.,
2011), trolls and propaganda account detection
(Darwish et al., 2017), detecting the likelihood of
hate crimes (Waseem and Hovy, 2016); and pre-
dicting conflict (Chadefaux, 2014). In this paper,
we describe our methodology for building a large
dataset of Arabic offensive tweets. Given that
roughly 1-2% of all Arabic tweets are offensive
(Mubarak and Darwish, 2019), targeted annotation
is essential for efficiently building a large dataset.
Since our methodology does not use a seed list of
offensive words, it is not biased by topic, target, or
dialect. Using our methodology, we tagged 10,000
Arabic tweet dataset for offensiveness, where of-
fensive tweets account for roughly 19% of the
tweets. Further, we labeled tweets as vulgar or
hate speech. To date, this is the largest available
dataset, which we plan to make publicly avail-
able along with annotation guidelines. We use this
dataset to characterize Arabic offensive language
to ascertain the topics, dialects, and users’ gen-
der that are most associated with the use of of-
fensive language. Though we suspect that there
are common features that span different languages
and cultures, some characteristics of Arabic of-
fensive language is language and culture specific.
Thus, we conduct a thorough analysis of how Ara-
bic users use offensive language. Next, we use
the dataset to train strong Arabic offensive lan-
guage classifiers using state-of-the-art representa-
tions and classification techniques. Specifically,
we experiment with static and contextualized em-
beddings for representation along with a variety of
classifiers such as a deep neural network classifier
and Support Vector Machine (SVM).
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We built the largest Arabic offensive lan-
guage dataset to date that includes special
tags for vulgar language and hate speech.
We describe the methodology for building it
along with annotation guidelines.
• We performed thorough analysis of the
dataset and described the peculiarities of Ara-
bic offensive language.
• We experimented with Support Vector Ma-
chine classifiers on character and word
ngrams classification techniques to provide
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strong results on Arabic offensive language
classification.
2 Related Work
Many recent papers have focused on the detec-
tion of offensive language, including hate speech
(Agrawal and Awekar, 2018; Badjatiya et al.,
2017; Davidson et al., 2017; Djuric et al., 2015;
Kwok and Wang, 2013; Malmasi and Zampieri,
2017; Nobata et al., 2016; Yin et al., 2009). Offen-
sive language can be categorized as: Vulgar, which
include explicit and rude sexual references, Porno-
graphic, and Hateful, which includes offensive re-
marks concerning peoples race, religion, country,
etc. (Jay and Janschewitz, 2008). Prior works have
concentrated on building annotated corpora and
training classification models. Concerning cor-
pora, hatespeechdata.com attempts to maintain
an updated list of hate speech corpora for multiple
languages including Arabic and English. Further,
SemEval 2019 ran an evaluation task targeted at
detecting offensive language, which focused ex-
clusively on English (Zampieri et al., 2019). As
for classification models, most studies used su-
pervised classification at either word level (Kwok
and Wang, 2013), character sequence level (Mal-
masi and Zampieri, 2017), and word embeddings
(Djuric et al., 2015). The studies used differ-
ent classification techniques including using Naı¨ve
Bayes (Kwok and Wang, 2013), SVM (Malmasi
and Zampieri, 2017), and deep learning (Agrawal
and Awekar, 2018; Badjatiya et al., 2017; Nobata
et al., 2016) classification. The accuracy of the
aforementioned system ranged between 76% and
90%. Earlier work looked at the use of sentiment
words as features as well as contextual features
(Yin et al., 2009).
The work on Arabic offensive language de-
tection is relatively nascent (Abozinadah, 2017;
Alakrot et al., 2018; Albadi et al., 2018; Mubarak
et al., 2017; Mubarak and Darwish, 2019).
Mubarak et al. (2017) suggested that certain users
are more likely to use offensive languages than
others, and they used this insight to build a list
of offensive Arabic words and they constructed
a labeled set of 1,100 tweets. Abozinadah et al.
(2017) used supervised classification based on a
variety of features including user profile features,
textual features, and network features. They re-
ported an accuracy of nearly 90%. Alakrot et
al. (2018) used supervised classification based
on word unigrams and n-grams to detect offen-
sive language in YouTube comments. They im-
proved classification with stemming and achieved
a precision of 88%. Albadi et al. (2018) focused
on detecting religious hate speech using a recur-
rent neural network. Further; Schmidt and Wie-
gand (2017) surveyed major works on hate speech
detection; Fortuna and Nunes (2018) provided a
comprehensive survey for techniques and works
done in the area between 2004 and 2017.
Arabic is a morphologically rich language with
a standard variety, namely Modern Standard Ara-
bic (MSA) and is typically used in formal com-
munication, and many dialectal varieties that dif-
fer from MSA in lexical selection, morphology,
and syntactic structures. For MSA, words are typ-
ically derived from a set of thousands of roots by
fitting a root into a stem template and the resulting
stem may accept a variety of prefixes and suffixes
such as coordinating conjunctions and pronouns.
Though word segmentation (or stemming) is quite
accurate for MSA (Abdelali et al., 2016), with ac-
curacy approaching 99%, dialectal segmentation
is not sufficiently reliable, with accuracy rang-
ing between 91-95% for different dialects (Samih
et al., 2017). Since dialectal Arabic is ubiquitous
in Arabic tweets and many tweets have creative
spellings of words, recent work on Arabic offen-
sive language detection used character-level mod-
els (Mubarak and Darwish, 2019).
3 Data Collection
3.1 Collecting Arabic Offensive Tweets
Our target was to build a large Arabic offensive
language dataset that is representative of their ap-
pearance on Twitter and is hopefully not biased
to specific dialects, topics, or targets. One of the
main challenges is that offensive tweets constitute
a very small portion of overall tweets. To quan-
tify their proportion, we took 3 random samples of
tweets from different days, with each sample com-
posed of 1,000 tweets, and we found that between
1% and 2% of them were in fact offensive (includ-
ing pornographic advertisement). This percentage
is consistent with previously reported percentages
(Mubarak et al., 2017). Thus, annotating random
tweets is grossly inefficient. One way to overcome
this problem is to use a seed list of offensive words
to filter tweets. However, doing so is problematic
as it would skew the dataset to particular types of
offensive language or to specific dialects. Offen-
siveness is often dialect and country specific.
After inspecting many tweets, we observed that
many offensive tweets have the vocative particle
AK
 (“yA” – meaning “O”)1, which is mainly used
in directing the speech to a specific person or
group. The ratio of offensive tweets increases to
5% if each tweet contains one vocative particle
and to 19% if has at least two vocative particles.
Users often repeat this particle for emphasis, as
in: é 	Kñ 	Jk AK
 ú
×

@ AK
 (“yA Amy yA Hnwnp” – O my
mother, O kind one), which is endearing and non-
offensive, and P 	Y¯ AK
 I. Ê¿ AK
 (“yA klb yA q*r” –
“O dog, O dirty one”), which is offensive. We de-
cided to use this pattern to increase our chances of
finding offensive tweets. One of the main advan-
tages of the pattern AK
 . . . AK
 (“yA ... yA”) is that it
is not associated with any specific topic or genre,
and it appears in all Arabic dialects. Though the
use of offensive language does not necessitate the
appearance of the vocative particle, the particle
does not favor any specific offensive expressions
and greatly improves our chances of finding offen-
sive tweets. It is clear, the dataset is more biased
toward positive class. Using the dataset for real-
life application may require de-biasing it by boost-
ing negative class or random sampling additional
data from Twitter (Wiegand et al., 2019).Using the
Twitter API, we collected 660k Arabic tweets hav-
ing this pattern between April 15, 2019 and May
6, 2019. To increase diversity, we sorted the word
sequences between the vocative particles and took
the most frequent 10,000 unique sequences. For
each word sequence, we took a random tweet con-
taining each sequence. Then we annotated those
tweets, ending up with 1,915 offensive tweets
which represent roughly 19% of all tweets. Each
tweet was labeled as: offensive, which could ad-
ditionally be labeled as vulgar and/or hate speech,
or Clean. We describe in greater detail our anno-
tation guidelines, which we made sure that they
are compatible with the OffensEval2019 annota-
tion guidelines (Zampieri et al., 2019). For ex-
ample, if a tweet has insults or threats targeting
a group based on their nationality, ethnicity, gen-
der, political affiliation, religious belief, or other
common characteristics, this is considered as hate
speech (Zampieri et al., 2019). It is worth men-
tioning that we also considered insulting groups
1Arabic words are provided along with their Buckwalter
transliteration and English translation.
based on their sport affiliation as a form of hate
speech. In most Arab countries, being a fan of a
particularly sporting club is considered as part of
the personality and ideology which rarely changes
over time (similar to political affiliation). Many
incidents of violence have occurred among fans of
rival clubs.
3.2 Annotating Tweets
We developed the annotation guidelines jointly
with an experienced annotator, who is a native
Arabic speaker with a good knowledge of various
Arabic dialects. We made sure that our guidelines
were compatible with those of OffensEval2019.
The annotator carried out all annotation. Tweets
were given one or more of the following four
labels: offensive, vulgar, hate speech, or clean.
Since the offensive label covers both vulgar and
hate speech and vulgarity and hate speech are not
mutually exclusive, a tweet can be just offensive
or offensive and vulgar and/or hate speech. The
annotation adhered to the following guidelines:
OFFENSIVE (OFF): Offensive tweets contain
explicit or implicit insults or attacks against other
people, or inappropriate language, such as:
Direct threats or incitement, ex: @ñ¯Qk@
é 	PAªÖÏ @ H@Q®Ó (“AHrqwA mqrAt AlmEArDp” –
“burn the headquarters of the opposition”) and
éÊJ¯ I. m.'

 	¯ A 	JÖÏ @ @ 	Yë (“h*A AlmnAfq yjb qtlh” –
“this hypocrite needs to be killed”).
Insults and expressions of contempt, which in-
clude: Animal analogy, ex: I. Ê¿ AK
 (“yA klb” – “O
dog”) and 	á. K É¿ (“kl tbn” – “eat hay”).; Insult to
family members, ex: ½Ó

@ hðP AK
 (“yA rwH Amk”
– “O mother’s soul”); Sexually-related insults, ex:
HñK
X AK
 (“yA dywv” – “O person without envy”);
Damnation, ex: ½	JªÊK
 é<Ë @ (“Allh ylEnk” – “may
Allah/God curse you”); and Attacks on morals and
ethics, ex: H.
	XA¿ AK
 (“yA kA*b” – “O liar”)
VULGAR (VLG): Vulgar tweets are a subset
of offensive tweets and contain profanity, such as
mentions of private parts or sexual-related acts or
references.
HATE SPEECH (HS): Hate speech tweets, a
subset of offensive tweets containing offensive
language targeting group based on common char-
acteristics such as: Race, ex: ú
m.
 	' 	P AK
 (“yA znjy”
– “O negro”); Ethnicity, ex. Am.
	' B@ Q 	®Ë @ (“Alfrs
AlAnjAs” – “Impure Persians”); Group or party,
ex: ú
«ñJ

 ¼ñK.

@ (“Abwk $ywEy” – “your father is
communist”); and Religion, ex: P 	Y®Ë@ ½	JK
X (“dynk
Alq*r” – “your filthy religion”).
CLEAN (CLN): Clean tweets do not contain
vulgar or offensive language. We noticed that
some tweets have some offensive words, but the
whole tweet should not be considered as offensive
due to the intention of users. This suggests that
normal string match without considering contexts
will fail in some cases. Examples of such ambigu-
ous cases include: Humor, ex: éêë ékQ 	®Ë @ èðY« AK

(“yA Edwp AlfrHp hhh” – “O enemy of happiness
hahaha”); Advice, ex: QK
 	Q 	 	g AK
 ½J.kAË É®K B
(“lA tql lSAHbk yA xnzyr” – “don’t say to
your friend: You are a pig”); Condition,
ex: ÉJ
Ô« AK
 	àñËñ®K
 Ñî D 	PA« @ 	X @ (“A*A EArDthm
yqwlwn yA Emyl” – “if you disagree with them
they will say: You are an agent”); Condem-
nation, ex: ? èQ®K. AK
 : Èñ®K. I. 
	 @ 	XAÖÏ (“lmA*A
nsb bqwl: yA bqrp?” – “Why do we insult
others by saying: O cow?”); Self offense, ex:
P 	Y®Ë@ ú

	G AË 	áÓ IJ.ªK (“tEbt mn lsAny Alq*r” – “I
am tired of my dirty tongue”); Non-human target,
ex: èPñ» AK
 é 	Kñ 	Jj. ÖÏ @ I 	K. AK
 (“yA bnt Almjnwnp
yA kwrp” – “O daughter of the crazy one O foot-
ball”); and Quotation from a movies or a story, ex:
É A 	¯ AK
 ú

	GAK ! ú
»
	P AK
 ú

	GAK (“tAny yA zky! tAny
yA fA$l” – “again O Zaky! again O loser”).
For other ambiguous cases, the annotator searched
Twitter to find how actual users used expressions.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the annotated
tweets. There are 1,915 offensive tweets, includ-
ing 225 vulgar tweet and 506 hate speech tweets,
and 8,085 clean tweets. To validate the quality of
annotation, a random sample of 100 tweets from
the data, containing 50 offensive and 50 clean
tweets, was given to additional three annotators.
We calculated the Inter-Annotator Agreement be-
tween the annotators using Fleisss Kappa coeffi-
cient (Fleiss, 1971). The Kappa score was 0.92
indicating high quality annotation and agreement.
3.3 Statistics and User Demographics
Given the annotated tweets, we wanted to ascer-
tain the distribution of: types of offensive lan-
guage, genres where it is used, the dialects used,
and the gender of users using such language.
Tweets Words
Offensive 1,915 38k
– Vulgar 225 4k
– Hate speech 506 13k
Clean 8,085 151k
Total 10,000 193k
Table 1: Distribution of offensive and clean tweets.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of topics asso-
ciated with offensive tweets. As the figure shows,
sports and politics are most dominant for offen-
sive language including vulgar and hate speech.
As for dialect, we looked at MSA and four ma-
jor dialects, namely Egyptian (EGY), Leventine
(LEV), Maghrebi (MGR), and Gulf (GLF). Fig-
ure 2 shows that 71% of vulgar tweets were writ-
ten in EGY followed by GLF, which accounted
for 13% of vulgar tweets. MSA was not used in
any of the vulgar tweets. As for offensive tweets
in general, EGY and GLF were used in 36% and
35% of the offensive tweets respectively. Unlike
the case of vulgar language where MSA was non-
existent, 15% of the offensive tweets were in fact
written in MSA. For hate speech, GLF and EGY
were again dominant and MSA consistuted 21%
of the tweets. This is consistent with findings
for other languages such as English and Italian
where vulgar language was more frequently asso-
ciated with colloquial language (Mattiello, 2005;
Maisto et al., 2017). Regarding the gender, Fig-
ure 3 shows that the vast majority of offensive
tweets, including vulgar and hate speech, were au-
thored by males. Female Twitter users accounted
for 14% of offensive tweets in general and 6% and
9% of vulgar and hate speech respectively. Figure
4 shows a detailed categorization of hate speech
types, where the top three include insulting groups
based on their political ideology, origin, and sport
affiliation. Religious hate speech appeared in only
15% of all hate speech tweets.
Next, we analyzed all tweets labeled as offen-
sive to better understand how Arabic speakers use
offensive language. Here is a breakdown of usage:
Direct name calling: The most frequent attack
is to call a person an animal name, and the
most used animals were I. Ê¿ (“klb” – “dog”),
PAÔg (“HmAr” – “donkey”), and Õæ
îE. (“bhym” –
“beast”). The second most common was insulting
mental abilities using words such as ú
æ.
	« (“gby”
– “stupid”) and ¡J
J.« (“EbyT” –“idiot”). Some
Figure 1: Topic distribution for offensive language and
its sub-categories
Figure 2: Dialect distribution for offensive language
and its sub-categories
culture-specific differences should be considered.
Not all animal names are used as insults. For
example, animals such as Y

@ (“Asd” – “lion”),
Q® (“Sqr” – “falcon”), and È@ 	Q 	« (“gzAl” –
“gazelle”) are typically used for praise. For other
insults, people use: some bird names such asék. Ag. X (“djAjp” – “chicken”), éÓñK. (“bwmp” –
“owl”), and H. @Q
	« (“grAb” – “crow”); insects
such as éK. AK. 	X (“*bAbp” – “fly”), PñQå (“SrSwr”
– “cockroach”), and èQåk (“H$rp” – “insect”);
microorganisms such as éÓñKQk. (“jrvwmp” –
“microbe”) and I. ËAj£ (“THAlb” – “algae”);
inanimate objects such as éÓ 	Qk. (“jzmp” – “shoes”)
and É¢ (“sTl” – “bucket”) among other usages.
Simile and metaphor: Users use simile and
metaphor were they would compare a person
to: an animal as in PñJË @ ø
 	P (“zy Alvwr” –
“like a bull”), ½®J
î 	E ú

	æªÖÞ (“smEny nhyqk” –
“let me hear your braying”), and ½ÊK
X 	Që (“hz
dylk” – “wag your tail”); a person with mental or
Figure 3: Gender distribution for offensive language
and its sub-categories
Disability/Diseases
Gender
Social Class/Job
Religion
Sport Affiliation
Origin (race, ethnicity, nationality)
Political Ideology
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Figure 4: Distribution of Hate Speech Types. Note: A
tweet may have more than one type.
physical disability such as ú
Íñ
	ª 	JÓ (“mngwly” –
“Mongolian (down-syndrome)”), ñªÓ (“mEwq”
– “disabled”), and Ð 	Q¯ (“qzm” – “dwarf”); and
to the opposite gender such as È@ñ 	K 
k. (“jy$
nwAl” – “Nawal’s army (Nawal is female name)”)
and ø
 	QK
 	P ø
 XA
	K (“nAdy zyzy” – “Zizi’s club (Zizi
is a female pet name)”).
Indirect speech: This type of offensive lan-
guage includes: sarcasm such as ½K@ñ 	k@ ú»
	X

@
(“A*kY AxwAtk” – “smartest one of your sib-
lings”) and Q
ÒmÌ'@
	¬ñÊJ
 	¯ (“fylswf AlHmyr” –
“the donkeys’ philosopher”); questions such as
èX ZAJ. 	ªË @ É¿ éK
 @ (“Ayh kl AlgbA dh” – “what is
all this stupidity”); and indirect speech such as
QÒJÓ Q
 	« Õç'
AîD.Ë @ ©Ó A
® 	JË @ (“AlnqA$ mE Alb-
hAym gyr mvmr” – “no use talking to cattle”).
Wishing Evil: This entails wishing death or
major harm to befall someone such as ¼Y 	gAK
 A 	JK. P
(“rbnA yAxdk” – “May God take (kill) you”),
½	JªÊK
 é<Ë @ (“Allh ylEnk” – “may Allah/God curse
you”), and éJ
ë@X ú

	¯ hðP (“rwH fy dAhyp” –
equivalent to “go to hell”).
Name alteration: One common way to insult
others is to change a letter or two in their names
to produce new offensive words that rhyme with
the original names. Some examples of such
include changing èQK
 	Qm.Ì'@ (“Aljzyrp” – “Aljazeera
(channel)”) to èQK
 	Q 	 	mÌ'@ (“Alxnzyrp” – “the pig”)
and 	àA 	®Ê 	g (“xlfAn” – “Khalfan (person name)”)
to 	àA 	¯Q 	k (“xrfAn” – “crazed”).
Societal stratification: Some insults are asso-
ciated with: certain jobs such as H. @ñK. (“bwAb”
– “doorman”) or ÐXA 	g (“xAdm” – “servant”); and
specific societal components such ø
 ðYK. (“bdwy”
– “bedouin”) and hC 	¯ (“flAH” – “farmer”).
Immoral behavior: These insults are associated
with negative moral traits or behaviors such as
Q
®k (“Hqyr” – “vile”), 	áK
A 	g (“xAyn” – “traitor”),
and  	¯ A 	JÓ (“mnAfq” – “hypocrite”).
Sexually related: They include expressions such
as Èñ 	k (“xwl” – “gay”), é	mð (“wsxp” – “prosti-
tute”), and Q« (“ErS” – “pimp”).
Figure 5 shows top words with the highest
valance score for individual words in the offen-
sive tweets. Larger fonts are used to highlight
words with highest score and align as well with the
categories mentioned ahead in the breakdown for
the offensive languages. We modified the valence
score described by Conover et al. (2011) to mag-
nify its value based on frequency of occurrence.
The score is computed as follows:
V (I) = 2
tf(I,Coff)
total(Coff)
tf(I,Coff)
total(Coff)
+
tf(I,Ccln)
total(Ccln)
− 1
where
tf(I, Ci) =
∑
a∈I
⋂
Ci
[ln(Cnt(a,Ci)) + 1]
total(Ci) =
∑
I tf(I, Ci)
Cnt(a,Ci) is the number of times word a was
used in offensive or clean tweets tweets Ci. In
essence, we are replacing term frequencies with
the natural log of the term frequencies.
4 Experiments
We conducted an extensive battery of experiments
on the dataset to establish strong Arabic offen-
sive language classification results. Though the
offensive tweets have finer-grained labels where
offensive tweet could also be vulgar or constitute
hate speech, we conducted coarser-grained classi-
fication to determine if a tweet was offensive or
not. For classification, we experimented with sev-
eral tweet representation and classification mod-
els. For tweet representations, we used: the count
of positive and negative terms, based on a polar-
Figure 5: Tag cloud for words with top valence score
among offensive class
ity lexicon; static embeddings, namely fastText
and Skip-Gram; and deep contextual embeddings,
namely BERTbase-multilingual.
4.1 Data Pre-processing
We performed several text pre-processing steps.
First, we tokenized the text using the Farasa Ara-
bic NLP toolkit (Abdelali et al., 2016). Second,
we removed URLs, numbers, and all tweet spe-
cific tokens, namely mentions, retweets, and hash-
tags as they are not part of the language semantic
structure, and therefore, not usable in pre-trained
embeddings. Third, we performed basic Arabic
letter normalization, namely variants of the let-
ter alef to bare alef, ta marbouta to ha, and alef
maqsoura to ya. We also separated words that
are commonly incorrectly attached such as I. Ê¿ AK

(“yAklb” – “O dog”), is split to I. Ê¿ AK
 (“yA klb”).
Lastly, we normalized letter repetitions to allow
for a maximum of 2 repeated letters. For example,
the token éêêêë (“hhhhh” – “ha ha ha ..”) is nor-
malized to éë (“hh”). We also removed the Ara-
bic short-diacritics (tashkeel) and word elongation
(kashida).
4.2 Representations
Lexical Features Since offensive words typi-
cally have a negative polarity, we wanted to test
the effectiveness of using a polarity lexicon in de-
tecting offensive tweets. For the lexicon, we used
NileULex (El-Beltagy, 2016), which is an Arabic
polarity lexicon containing 3,279 MSA and 2,674
Egyptian terms, out of which 4,256 are negative
and 1,697 are positive. We used the counts of
terms with positive polarity and terms with neg-
ative polarity in tweets as features.
Static Embeddings We experimented with vari-
ous static embeddings that were pre-trained on dif-
ferent corpora with different vector dimensional-
ity. We compared pre-trained embeddings to em-
beddings that were trained on our dataset. For pre-
trained embeddings, we used: fastText Egyptian
Arabic pre-trained embeddings (Bojanowski et al.,
2017) with vector dimensionality of 300; Ar-
aVec skip-gram embeddings (Mohammad et al.,
2017), trained on 66.9M Arabic tweets with 100-
dimensional vectors; and Mazajak skip-gram em-
beddings (Abu Farha and Magdy, 2019), trained
on 250M Arabic tweets with 300-dimensional
vectors.
Sentence embeddings were calculated by taking
the mean of the embeddings of their tokens. The
importance of testing a character level n-gram
model like fastText lies in the agglutinative nature
of the Arabic language. We trained a new fast-
Text text classification model (Joulin et al., 2017)
on our dataset with vectors of 40 dimensions, 0.5
learning rate, 2−10 character n-grams as features,
for 30 epochs. These hyper-parameters were tuned
using a 5-fold cross-validated grid-search.
Deep Contextualized Embeddings We also ex-
perimented with pre-trained contextualized em-
beddings with fine-tuning for down-stream tasks.
Recently, deep contextualized language models
such as BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Represen-
tations from Transformers) (Devlin et al., 2019),
UMLFIT (Howard and Ruder, 2018), and OpenAI
GPT (Radford et al., 2018), to name but a few,
have achieved ground-breaking results in many
NLP classification and language understanding
tasks. In this paper, we used BERTbase-multilingual
(hereafter as simply BERT) fine-tuning method to
classify Arabic offensive language on Twitter as
it eliminates the need of heavily engineered task-
specific architectures. Although Robustly Op-
timized BERT (RoBERTa) embeddings perform
better than (BERTlarge) on GLUE (Wang et al.,
2018), RACE (Lai et al., 2017), and SQuAD (Ra-
jpurkar et al., 2016) tasks, pre-trained multilingual
RoBERTa models are not available. BERT is pre-
trained on Wikipedia text from 104 languages and
comes with hundreds of millions of parameters. It
contains an encoder with 12 Transformer blocks,
hidden size of 768, and 12 self-attention heads.
Though the training data for the BERT embed-
dings don’t match our genre, these embedding use
BP sub-word segments. Following Devlin et al.
(2019), the classification consists of introducing
a dense layer over the final hidden state h cor-
responding to first token of the sequence, [CLS],
adding a softmax activation on the top of BERT to
predict the probability of the l label:
p(l|h) = softmax(Wh),
where W is the task-specific weight matrix. Dur-
ing fine-tuning, all BERT parameters together with
W are optimized end-to-end to maximize the log-
probability of the correct labels.
4.3 Classification Models
We explored different classifiers. When using lex-
ical features and pre-trained static embeddings,
we primarily used an SVM classifier with a ra-
dial basis function kernel. Only when using the
Mazajak embeddings, we experimented with other
classifiers such as AdaBoost and Logistic regres-
sion. We did so to show that the SVM classifier
was indeed the best of the bunch, and we picked
the Mazajak embeddings because they yielded the
best results among all static embeddings. We
used the Scikit Learn implementations of all the
classifiers such as libsvm for the SVM classi-
fier. We also experimented with fastText, which
trained embeddings on our data. When using con-
textualized embeddings, we fine-tuned BERT by
adding a fully-connected dense layer followed by
a softmax classifier, minimizing the binary cross-
entropy loss function for the training data. For all
experiments, we used the PyTorch2 implementa-
tion by HuggingFace3 as it provides pre-trained
weights and vocabulary.
4.4 Evaluation
For all of our experiments, we used 5-fold cross
validation with identical folds for all experiments.
Table 2 reports on the results of using lexical fea-
tures, static pre-trained embeddings with an SVM
classifier, embeddings trained on our data with
fastText classifier, and BERT over a dense layer
with softmax activation. As the results show, using
Mazajak/SVM yielded the best results overall with
large improvements in precision over using BERT.
We suspect that the Mazajak/SVM combination
2https://pytorch.org/
3https://github.com/huggingface/
transformers
performed better than the BERT setup due to the
fact that the Mazajak embeddings, though static,
were trained on in-domain data, as opposed to
BERT. Perhaps if BERT embeddings were trained
on tweets, they might have outperformed all other
setups. For completeness, we compared 7 other
classifiers with SVM using Mazajak embeddings.
As results in Table 3 show, using SVM yielded the
best results.
Model/classifier Prec. Recall F1
Lexical Features
SVM 68.5 35.3 46.6
Pre-trained static embeddings
fastText/SVM 76.7 43.5 55.5
AraVec/SVM 85.5 69.2 76.4
Mazajak/SVM 88.6 72.4 79.7
Embeddings trained on our data
fastText/fastText 82.1 68.1 74.4
Contextualized embeddings
BERTbase-multilingual 78.3 74.0 76.0
Table 2: Classification performance with different fea-
tures and models.
Model Prec. Recall F1
Decision Tree 51.2 53.8 52.4
Random Forest 82.4 42.4 56.0
Gaussian NB 44.9 86.0 59.0
Perceptron 75.6 67.7 66.8
AdaBoost 74.3 67.0 70.4
Gradient Boosting 84.2 63.0 72.1
Logistic Regression 84.7 69.5 76.3
SVM 88.6 72.4 79.7
Table 3: Performance of different classification models
on Mazajak embeddings.
4.5 Error Analysis
We inspected the tweets of one fold that were mis-
classified by the Mazajak/SVM model (36 false
positives/121 false negatives) to determine the
most common errors.
False Positives had four main types:
• Gloating: ex. èYJ
J.ë AK
 (“yA hbydp” - “O you
delusional”) referring to fans of rival sports
team for thinking they could win.
• Quoting: ex. I. Ê¿ AK
 Èñ®K
ð I. 
 Yg AÖÏ
(“lmA Hd ysb wyqwl yA klb” – “when some-
one swears and says: O dog”).
• Idioms: ex. ½	JK
X QåA 	g AK
 	àA 	ÓP Q£A 	¯ AK
 (“yA
fATr rmDAn yA xAsr dynk” – “o you who does
not fast Ramadan, you who have lost your reli-
gion”), which is a colloquial idiom.
• Implicit Sarcasm: ex. ½¾  	QK
A« I	K@ 	áK
A 	g AK


QÊË I. ª Ë@ I. k ú

	¯ (“yA KAyn Ant
EAwz t$kk fy Hb Al$Eb llrys” – “O traitor,
(you) want to question the love of the people to
the president ”) where the author is mock-
ing the president’s popularity.
False Negatives had two types:
• Mixture of offensiveness and admiration: ex.
calling a girl a puppy éK. ñJ. Ê¿ AK
 (“yA klbwbp” –
“O puppy”) in a flirtatious manner.
• Implicit offensiveness: ex. call-
ing for cure while implying sanity in:	QÖÏ @ 	áÓ Q¢¯ ÐA¾k ù

	® ð (“wt$fy HkAm
qTr mn AlmrD” – “and cure Qatar rulers from
illness”).
Many errors stem from heavy use of dialectal
Arabic as well as ambiguity. Since BERT was
trained on Wikipedia (MSA) and Google books,
the model failed to classify tweets with dialectal
cues. Conversely, Mazajak/SVM is more biased
towards dialects, often failing to classify MSA
tweets.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we presented a systematic method
for building an Arabic offensive language tweet
dataset that does not favor specific dialects, top-
ics, or genres. We developed detailed guidelines
for tagging the tweets as clean or offensive, in-
cluding special tags for vulgar tweets and hate
speech. We tagged 10,000 tweets, which we plan
to release publicly and would constitute the largest
available Arabic offensive language dataset. We
characterized the offensive tweets in the dataset
to determine the topics that illicit such language,
the dialects that are most often used, the common
modes of offensiveness, and the gender distribu-
tion of their authors. We performed this break-
down for offensive tweets in general and for vulgar
and hate speech tweets separately. We believe that
this is the first detailed analysis of its kind. Lastly,
we conducted a large battery of experiments on
the dataset, using cross-validation, to establish a
strong system for Arabic offensive language de-
tection. We showed that using static embeddings
produced a competitive results on the dataset.
For future work, we plan to pursue several di-
rections. First, we want explore target specific of-
fensive language, where attacks against an entity
or a group may employ certain expressions that are
only offensive within the context of that target and
completely innocuous otherwise. Second, we plan
to examine the effectiveness of cross dialectal and
cross lingual learning of offensive language.
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